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Possible identity trajectories for Russians in the 
former Soviet republic. 
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Department of East European and Oriental Studies 
University of Oslo 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The collapse of the unitary Soviet state has plunged its  former citizens into  
a profound identity crisis. Particularly hard hit are the twentyfive million 
Russians living in the non-Russian successor states. Formerly members of 
the dominant nationality of a multinational state they have been  turned into 
a new Russian diaspora.  Whether they in time  should come to look upon 
themselves as Latvians (Ukrainians, Georgians, etc.) of Russian extraction 
or as Russians who happen to be living in Latvia, Ukraine, Georgia, etc. 
will clearly influence political  relation both within and among the Soviet 
successor states.  
Identity formation is a prolonged process and influenced by a number of 
factors. The authors attempts to outline a typology of possible identity 
trajectories of the Russian diaspora and  discusses a number of influence 
factors which are deemed important to the identity formation. These factors 
work very differently in the various non-Russian successor states, and it is 
therefore no reason to believe that all Russians living outside the Russian 
Federation will develop the same identity. There is, however, good reason 
to expect that  in the final outcome a very large number  of them will 
develop an identity which sets them apart  from the Russian core group.  
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Introduction 
Like any other identity, ethnic identity is a malleable quality (Keyes 1982; de 
Vos and Romanucci-Ross 1982). The speed, direction, depth, and extension of 
this change will depend upon a number of factors. These factors may be cultural, 
for instance exposure to new ethnic groups through migration, or result from 
changes in the economic structure of society (industrialization, etc.) (Gellner 
1983).  
Post-Soviet society is characterized by rapid and deep changes all across the 
board, political, economic, and cultural. The reified world of 'Soviet reality' 
(sovetskaia deistvitel'nost') has collapsed as a deck of cards. This event affects 
most aspects of the identity of the former Soviet citizens - political, ideological, 
religious, ethnic, etc. This article will focus on two aspects of identity 
development, political and ethnic: which state and which ethnic culture will 
become the foci of identity? In order to keep these two identity axes 
terminologically apart, I will employ the terms 'loyalty' for the political axis and 
'selfunderstanding' for the cultural axis. Both loyalty and selfunderstanding are 
intended as synonyms for identity.  
The identity crisis affects the ethnic groups of the former USSR to different 
degrees. Two groups are hit particularly hard: politically, the Russians (as the 
former dominant nation of a defunct state), and culturally, the various diaspora 
groups, since the unitary Soviet state is today being replaced by nationalizing 
states in which they stick out as cultural anomalies. The twentyfive million 
Russians living outside the Russian Federation, 'the new Russian diaspora', 
straddle both these categories, and might be said to have received the blow of the 
post-Soviet identity crisis two-fold. This group is the subject of this article.  
Due to their high numbers, their habitat in territories which in the Soviet 
system were deemed to be in some sense the 'property' of other major ethnic 
groups (the titular nations of the non-Russian Union republics), and the fact that 
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they were generally (if not necessarily correctly) associated with the central 
Union leadership and even seen as its collective agents, the Russians outside the 
RSFSR were central to any study of ethnic relations in the USSR. Many students 
of Soviet nationality problems were interested in how the presence of the 
Russians influenced the sentiments, attitudes, and behaviour of the non-Russians 
(Carrère d’Encausse 1979; Karklins 1986). The reverse relationship was less 
studied. In May 1978, however, Columbia University organized a colloquium on 
'Ethnic Russia Today: Undergoing an Identity Crisis?' (Allworth 1980). Two of 
the participants dealt with the prospective identity development of the Russian 
diaspora.1 Intriguingly, they reached almost opposite conclusions. William Boris 
Kory remarked that  
in spite of being a minority group and despite great distances from 
the Russian heartland, the ethnic Russian migrants retain their 
language and ethnic identity.(...) The ethnic identity of the Russian 
population does not seem to diminish with the increased distance 
from the Russian heartland (Kory 1980, pp. 288, 290). 
Matthews Pavlovich, on the other hand, suggested that the Russian diaspora 
was in the process of acquiring an identity of its own, different from the identity 
of the central Russians.  
The wide demographic dispersion from the traditional core of 
Russia to the other Soviet union republics (...) has created two 
distinct Russian groups: the core and the periphery - conditions 
which will ultimately weaken Russian ethnic cohesion and 
probably alter the future of both groups. (...) The Russian settlers 
were ultimately forced to adapt to the environments and traditions 
dominant at their new place of residence, which further separated 
them from the core group (Pavlovich 1980, p. 294).  
Pavlovich’s hypothesis ran counter to the more common assumption that 
members of an ethnic group who come into close contact with neighbouring 
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groups develop an especially strong sense of attachment to their nation. 
According to a generally accepted theory, national identity is to a large degree 
acquired through a 'We-They' contrast. As the core group is less frequently 
confronted with 'them', it also has a less distinct identity as being 'us' (Allworth 
1980, pp. 306-7). Raymond Pearson, for one, has unequivocally stated that 
'"border dwellers" are more sensitive about national identity and loyalty through 
day-to-day proximity to the state frontier, develop firmer commitments through 
awareness of the alternatives and are most subject to neuroses about territorial 
adjustments and therefore national security' (Pearson 1983, p. 20). Pearson goes 
one step beyond Kory by claiming that in the periphery national identity is not 
only not altered or loosened, but strengthened.  
Whether for lack of empirical fuel or for lack of methodological clarity, the 
Western debate on the Russian diaspora identity  in the late 1970s petered out, or 
rather: never really took off. Today, I believe, it is high time to resurrect it. After 
the breakup of the Soviet unitary state some of its methodological problems will 
be easier to come to terms with. As a new political map has been superimposed 
on the demographic map of the former Soviet Union, the line between the core 
and the diaspora has become drawn as with a scalpel. In the political sense at 
least it is now possible to claim that Russians living on one side of a state border 
belong to the core group, while their ethnic brethren a stone’s throw away on the 
other side belong to the diaspora. Although this new political arrangement may 
not immediately be reflected on the mental level, it is reasonable to suspect that 
in the long run it will significantly affect the selfunderstanding of the people 
involved.  
The new political map affects not only the methodology of the research, but 
also its urgency. In 1978 the distinction between a Russian core group and a 
diaspora group was a purely analytical tool in an academic discussion and 
concerned scholars only. Today, this is a question of immediate relevance for 
policy makers as well. If the diaspora Russians in, say, Latvia should come to see 
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themselves as 'Latvians of Russian extraction' this will affect the political 
discourse and political stability in the region quite differently than if they should 
consider themselves as 'Russians who happen to be living in Latvia' (Aasland 
1994a).  
In the 1970s and '80s some Western research was conducted on the topic of 
'comparative diasporas' (Sheffer 1986). However, very few of its insights are 
applicable to the study of the Russian minority communities in the former Soviet 
republics since 'diasporas' in this research were defined as migrant communities 
far removed from their homelands rather than as stranded groups of contracted 
multinational states such as have been created in Eastern Europe in the twentieth 
century - the Hungarian, Serbian and Russian diasporas. John Armstrong 
explicitly excluded from his definition of  diasporas groups that are not 'averse to 
political attachment to its great society ' (Armstrong 1976, p. 395). Only very 
recently have post-imperial diasporas become an object of serious comparative 
and theoretical analysis. (Brubaker 1993a; Brubaker 1993b), but this research has 
so far not been primarily concerned with the identity aspect.  
My present contribution to this debate will not be in the form of any large-
scale sociological survey, but is much more modest. First, I will present a list of 
possible identities for the Russian diaspora. Second, I will consider some of the 
more important factors which might be expected to influence the formation and 
change of identity among diaspora Russians. Third, I will venture some 
conjectures about possible identity trajectories in the various regions of the 
former Soviet Union by applying the identity types and influence factors laid out 
in part I and part II. Finally, some material evidence in support of my hypotheses 
will be adduced. This evidence will be gleaned from opinion polls conducted by 
other researchers as well as from  interviews of diaspora leaders which I have 
made myself. 
There is of course no reason to believe that all members of 'the new Russian 
diaspora' will act and react in a uniform manner. On the contrary, the very term 
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'the Russian diaspora' may be highly problematic since the definite mode, 
singular, obfuscates the magnitude of the differences within the group. We 
should be on the look-out for varieties within the diaspora just as much as for 
patterns of regularities. Within the framework of an article the pictures of the 
various diaspora communities will inevitably be drawn with a broad brush. For 
more details and nuances I refer the reader to my book on the subject (Kolstoe 
1995). 
Any attempt to forecast the identity trajectories of the Russian diaspora in the 
various regions of the former Soviet Union will necessarily be somewhat 
speculative. Identity formation is a protracted process, spanning decades and 
generations. One should be very cautious about mechanical extrapolation of 
present day trends into the future. From other parts of the world we know that 
third generation immigrants often reject the cultural preferences of their parents 
and sometimes consciously attempt to recapture parts of their grandparents' 
identity (rediscover their 'roots'). Also, since man is not a socially programmable 
machine, many individual case stories will no doubt differ significantly from 
probability calculated outcomes.  
 
II Identity types of post-imperial diasporas 
What, then, are the ‘identity options'2 open to the diaspora Russians (provided 
that they remain a diaspora , that is to say, that they are not reunited with the core 
group by migration or by  the reestablishment of the unitary state)? Culturally, 
the Russian diaspora may be said to be confronted with the choice of three 
identities: identification with the dominant culture in the external homeland (= 
Russia); development of a new but still basically Russian selfunderstanding, and 
identification with the dominant culture in the state of residence (= the new 
nationalizing state). Politically, the options may be seen as fourfold: loyalty 
towards the historical boundaries of the Russian state up to and including 
attempts to resurrect it; loyalty towards the present and much reduced Russian 
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state, the Russian Federation; aspirations for the creation of a new nation-state; 
and finally loyalty towards the nationalizing state of residence. Hypothetically 
this gives us twelve positions. However, some of them are so unlikely to be 
found in real life that they may be discounted. The eight remaining positions 
plotted into the matrix below all reflect attitudes and identities which I have been 
met with among members of the Russian minority communities in the Soviet 
successor states.3 While the above typology in a sense is tailored to the special 
situation of the Russian diaspora, I believe that in principle it is applicable to 
other  post-imperial diaspora groups as well.  
 
TABLE 1 IN HERE 
 
The horizontal axis of the matrix describes a continuum of positions 
stretching from minimal change to the left towards complete cultural 
reidentification to the right. In addition to the three positions given numerous 
nuances and intermediate types are conceivable. The vertical axis, on the other 
hand, describes a more discontinuous set of choices. While also political loyalties 
may be vague and blurred, the individual will eventually have to make a choice 
between the political entities available to him as to which one he will pledge his 
allegiance. He may postpone the identity choice or hide behind a posture of 'dual 
loyalty' but he cannot ride two horses indefinitely. In a military conflict a soldier 
cannot fight on the side of two warring parties at the same time.  
Another difference between political loyalty and cultural selfunderstanding 
concerns the speed of alteration. Political loyalties can change much faster than 
do cultural selfunderstandings. The radical changes leading up to the demise of 
the Soviet Union is a prime example of the fabulous speed political reorientations 
may acquire in exceptional situations.  
In real life many diaspora Russians will probably find it hard to give a 
clearcut answer whenever they are asked to describe their cultural 
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selfunderstanding or their political loyalty. Their responses will often depend 
upon the context in which the question is posed. If the frame of reference is (the 
dominant culture in) the state of residence they might describe themselves as 
simply 'Russian'. However, if the context is (the dominant culture in) the external 
homeland they might tend to accentuate the peculiar traits which set them apart 
them from the Russian core group.  
 
CULTURAL OPTION (A). IDENTIFYING CULTURALLY WITH THE EXTERNAL 
HOMELAND. 
In the Soviet Union every person was ascribed a dual identity: political, as citizen 
of the Soviet Union, and ethnic, as member of a particular nationality 
(natsional'nost'). This duality was reflected in the internal passports where 
'citizenship' and 'nationality' were recorded separately (Zaslavsky 1982). Thus, 
the Soviet citizens living outside their 'own' republic were not only allowed but 
also obliged to identify ethnically with the core group. Those Russian diasporians 
who fall under cultural option A in our matrix have internalized the official 
nationality ascribed to them. 
(A1) Political loyalty towards historical boundaries: traditional Soviet. To be 
sure, the 'historical boundaries' of Russia have changed considerably over time, 
one of the distinguishing features of the Russian empire being the constant 
expansion of its territory (Kappeler 1992). For our purposes (A1) shall mean 
loyalty towards the Soviet state within the borders it possessed at the time of its 
dissolution. We are concerned with political loyalty in the territorial sense only, 
not in the ideological sense. This means that anti-Communist Russians who 
identify with and want to have restored the tsarist Russian empire also fall into 
this position.4  
(A2) Irredentism. Russians in non-Russian Soviet successor states may 
accept the breakup of the Soviet Union as irreversible, but nonetheless fail to 
adopt an identity as citizens of the new nationalizing states. Instead of the USSR 
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their territorial focus of identity is ‘Russia’ in the narrow sense, the Russian 
Federation, which is regarded as a Russian nation-state. Russian 'diasporians' 
living in areas adjacent to Russia might demand border revisions in order to end 
up on the 'right' (= the Russian) side of the border. 
(A3) Integrating national minority. The Russians may adopt a political 
identity as citizens of the successor states, but retain a cultural identity as 
Russians. This option could be labelled 'integrating minority'. Western Europe 
offers several examples of such groups: the Swedes in Finland, the Germans of 
Alsace, Danes in Northern Germany, Germans in Southern Denmark, etc. In this 
variant the diaspora Russians will tend to participate actively in the social and 
political system in the state of residence, using their 'voice' to fight for causes 
which may secure their continued existence as a distinct group.  
 
CULTURAL OPTION (B). NEW RUSSIAN SELFUNDERSTANDING.  
The Russian diasporians may retain an identity as Russians, but nonetheless see 
themselves as Russians of a special kind. Having lived for generations in a 
culturally alien environment they have adopted quite a few of the habits, 
customs, and ways of life prevalent in the region (Arutiunian and Drobizheva 
1992; Susokolov 1992). Politically, this identity may go hand in hand with 
loyalty towards the external homeland; with a desire to gain a statehood of their 
own; as well as with loyalty towards the state of residence. 
(B1 and B2) 'New Cossacks'. These identity positions are very similar to that 
of the Cossacks. The Cossacks are a Russian-speaking, ethno-social group which 
was formed in the ethnic borderland in the southern parts of the Russian empire 
in the 16th to the 19th centuries. Historically they represent a mixture of several 
ethnic groups, but culturally they have greatest affinity to the Russian ethnos. 
Nonetheless, they have developed a number of peculiar traditions as regards 
social organization, trades and crafts, idioms, etc. This is reflected in their 
selfunderstanding. They keenly feel that they are different from ordinary 
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Russians, although they may have difficulty explaining what this difference 
actually consists in.5 A structurally similar identity is adopted by parts of the 
present-day Russian settlers in the Russian ethnic periphery.6 
The Cossack concept of the Russian state is usually of the imperial kind and 
is identified with Tsarist Russia. However, some latter-day Cossacks, inside and 
outside Russia, are orienting themselves towards the new, modern Russian state 
as their focus of identity. The same seems to be the case with the 'new Cossacks'. 
Often they do not make any explicit distinction between the two Russian state 
concept which indeed may reflect their 'maximum' and 'minimum' programs, 
respectively.  
(B3) The Dniester Syndrome. Russians with an identity of their own might 
also see the creation of a new, independent state as a natural corollary of their 
cultural distinctiveness. Recent years have seen at least two attempts to establish 
new national statelets involving diaspora Russians: the Dniester Moldovan 
Republic (DMR) and the Republic of Crimea. Both of them have an unsettled 
international status and somewhat unclear political aspirations. Political leaders 
of both insist that the  Slavic population in the area, while having strong 
historical, cultural and emotional links to Russia, also has developed an identity 
of its own.7 
 The would-be new state on the eastern bank of Dniester broke away from the 
Moldovan Republic in September 1990 and in the summer of 1992 defended its 
secession in a limited war against Moldovan forces. With the backing of Russian 
army units stationed in the area DMR is today for all practical purposes a 
separate political unit, seeking international recognition and membership in the 
CIS (Kolstø et al 1993). Crimea, with a two thirds Russian population, was in 
1991 granted status as an autonomous republic within the Republic of Ukraine 
but important segments of the political community on the peninsula strive for 
more. Many observers have been left with the impression that the  endeavours to 
create an independent Republic of Crimea is more a means than an end, the end 
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being reunification with Russia (either in the larger, tsarist or the smaller, modern 
version). The many separatist movements of Crimea seem to have a much clearer 
idea as to which state they do not want to belong to (Ukraine) than as to what 
they want to put in its place.  
(B4) 'Integrating new diaspora'. Importantly, a sense of cultural 
distinctiveness among the Russian diaspora does not have to be translated into 
political demands. On the contrary, there is reason to believe that diaspora 
Russians with a sense of being dissimilar to the Russian core group will more 
easily accept the post-Soviet political arrangement than will Russians with a 
selfunderstanding indistinguishable from the core group. The former will tend to 
develop an 'integrating new diaspora' identity.  
 
CULTURAL OPTION (C). ADOPTION OF THE DOMINANT CULTURE OF 
THE NATIONALIZING STATE OF RESIDENCE.  
(C3) Assimilation. In most cases adoption of the dominant culture of the state of 
residence will mean inculturization into the titular nationality, this is: 
assimilation. Usually change of mother tongue will be the most important 
ingredient in an assimilation process. Assimilated diasporians will not only learn 
the language of the titular nationality, but, within a generation or so, they will 
forget their former mother tongue.  
To the extent that Russians will be assimilated into the titular group, they 
may continue to have a hazy memory of the distant origin of their forebears, but 
for all practical purposes they will shed their identity as being ethnic Russians. 
Their identity situation will be comparable to the situation of most European 
immigrant groups in the USA, whose only links to their cultural past may be a 
quaint surname and a dusted photo-collection somewhere in the attic. Most 
Russians in the United States, as well as in Western Europe, belong to this 
category.  
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II Factors influencing identity formation  
The identity choices of the diaspora Russians will be strongly influenced by a 
number of circumstances. Some of them affect the entire group within a given 
area, while some vary from individual to individual within the community. The 
most important of them, as I see it, are enumerated below. The list is offered not 
as a stringent set of independent variables, the specific weight of which can be 
measured statistically and from which the identity type of the different diaspora 
groups can be deduced. Rather it should be seen as a heuristic check list which 
we ought to have in the back of our mind when we turn to the empirical 
evidence. 
(1) Geographic distance to Russia. If the external homeland is just across the 
border, the identity links between it and the diaspora are less likely to be severed 
than in the cases when it is far away. In the latter case it is more reasonable to 
expect that the local diaspora groups will develop an identity of its own or adopt 
the local culture. 
(2) Cultural distance to the surrounding environment. I expect that in cases 
when the local culture is (perceived as) markedly different from Russian culture, 
rapprochement is less likely than when the two are (perceived as) varieties of the 
same basic type. Examples of the first kind would be the Central Asian 
(Turkic/Iranian, Muslim) cultures, while the most obvious examples of the latter 
are the Ukrainian and Belorussian (East Slav, mostly Orthodox) cultures.  
(3) Numbers and compactness. The larger the Russian community is within a 
given area, the greater is the chance that it will hang on to a distinct identity. 
Small diaspora groups are 'endanger species'. However, if small groups are 
sufficiently compact, they might still be able to withstand assimilation. 
Conversely, if a diaspora group is scattered over vast areas and lives intermingled 
with other ethnic groups it will more easily adopt its basic characteristics, 
including language.  
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(4) Rootedness. It is reasonable to expect that the longer the Russians have 
lived in a given area, the more closely they identify with it. Newcomers will not 
feel the same degree of territorial attachment. Not only inhabitants of centuries-
old Russian settlements may have a strong sense of rootedness, it can be felt also 
by third or second generation Russians. 
(5) The absence/presence of burning issues other than the national one. The 
human mind does not seem able to be preoccupied with more than a limited 
number of concerns simultaneously, and the importance of the ethnic issue is 
relative to the importance of other issues. For instance, in periods of economic 
depression and abruptly falling standards of living socio-economic issues 
demand a lot of attention. Confronted with the struggle for the daily bread the 
members of ethnic minorities may not have time or capacity to fight for less 
pressing needs such as cultural rights. Instead, they might align themselves and 
identify with their work-mates, and as a result their class identity might be 
strengthened. However, if wealth and social positions in society are unevenly 
distributed among the various ethnic groups, and/or the economic policy of the 
state is deliberately geared towards an uneven distribution of wealth along ethnic 
lines, the ethnic issue will not only resurface but even be reinforced by economic 
factors (Horowitz 1985, pp. 20-1).  
(6) Bilingualism/monolingualism. I expect Russians with no or scarce 
knowledge of the language of the titular nation in the country of residence to be 
more prone to hang on to a restitutionist or irredentist Russian identity, while 
bilinguals more easily will adapt to the dominant culture. 
Proficiency in the titular language varies tremendously among the various 
Russian diaspora groups, from 0.8 per cent to thirtyseven per cent claiming 
fluency  in 1989 census (See table 3).  However, 'fluency' was poorly defined by 
the Soviet census authorities, and probably cover a wide variety of proficiency 
levels (Guboglo 1992; Kozlov and Kozlov 1994).   
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In many of the new nationalizing states the language laws and the 
requirements for proficiency in the native language is the main issue in the 
confrontations between the titular nation and the minorities. In most cases when 
the distinction between speakers and non-speakers of the state language is very 
much stressed in the political debate this will reinforce the contrast between the 
indigenous population and the outsiders.  
(7) The identity development of other ethnic minorities. Many members of 
the non-Russian diaspora groups are linguistically russified. In the post-Soviet 
discourse the term 'russified' is frequently used in a derogatory sense, signifying 
lack of ethnic identity. Russified non-Russians, however, can be seen as a group 
in the process of changing their ethnic identity. While people sharing a common 
language don’t per se constitute an ethnic group, they may over time be 
transformed into one. If we think of ethnic groups as groups sharing common 
cultural traits and common interests, the Russified non-Russians on the one hand 
and the Russian diaspora group on the other in a given area may in time coalesce 
into a common group, a distinct 'Russian-speaking post-Soviet diaspora'. (If this 
really takes place, a more elegant appellation will no doubt be found for it.)  
(8) Endogamy/exogamy. In the Soviet Union children in ethnically mixed 
families were the only persons confronted with an identity choice. When they 
reached the age of sixteen they had to choose the nationality of one of the 
parents. ('mixed' or 'new' identity was not an option.) When either the mother or 
the father was a member of the titular nationality in the republic of residence, the 
children tended to choose his or her nationality (Kozlov 1982, pp. 216-18; 
Karklins 1986, p. 154-5). For instance, the offspring of a mixed Latvian-Russian 
couple living in Russia usually chose a Russian identity, in Latvia, a Latvian one. 
(Some other factors also played a certain role, such as the sex of the Latvian vs. 
the Russian parent.) Such marriages, then, favoured the assimilation of the 
persons involved into the titular nation. It is every reason to believe that this will 
continue to be the case also in post-Soviet societies.  
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In the Soviet Union marriages between Russians and members of the titular 
nationality in the non-Russian republics was the most common kind of 
interethnic marriages(Komarova 1980, p. 33). In 1989, they amounted to 11.8 per 
cent of all interethnic marriages in Central Asia, 24 per cent in Kazakhstan, 22.9 
per cent in Moldova, thirtytwo per cent in the Baltics, 25.1 to 53.7 per cent  in 
Transcaucasia and 57 per cent and 74.7 per cent  in  the East Slavic republics 
(Pain 1992). Rogers Brubaker finds it problematic to subsume Russians in such 
crosscultural families under the common denominator 'Russian', plain and simple 
(Brubaker 1993a). 
A large number of mixed marriages were also concluded between Russian 
diasporians and members of other diaspora groups. When a Russian in a non-
Russian republic married a Ukrainian, Belorussian, or Jew, a frequent 
occurrence, their children usually chose the Russian nationality (Susokolov 1992, 
pp. 191-216). Under post-Soviet realities a high percentage of such marriages in 
a Soviet successor state will promote the development of a common 'Russophone' 
or 'new Russian' identity.  
Exogamy frequency is clearly linked to factor (1): cultural distance. The 
shorter this distance, the greater the number of mixed marriages. Also, if the 
cultural distance to the dominant culture is very large, this may lead to greater 
amalgamation among kindred national minorities in the state (Horowitz 1985, p. 
40). In addition, large ethnic groups are usually more relaxed on the issue of 
ethnically mixed marriages than are smaller ones.  
(9) The presence of elites among the local Russians. I expect that diaspora 
groups with weak elite structures will be less able to articulate common interests 
and sustain a common identity than are groups possessing elites able to take 
leadership roles in the ethnic community.8 Elite formation is usually linked to 
levels of modernization and urbanization. Compared to most other post-Soviet 
nationalities Russians have high levels of formal education and with the 
exception of the Jews, the Russians are also the most urbanized post-Soviet 
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people. If this is true in general, it is even more so in the case of diaspora 
Russians. The great bulk of them live in large cities, sometimes constituting a 
majority or near-majority (Lewis et al 1976). However, while the Russian 
diaspora communities do have numerically strong intellectual elites, the 
professional structure of the contemporary Russian diaspora intelligentsia is 
heavily tilted towards technology and the exact sciences. Engineers are often less 
concerned with the maintenance of ethnic culture than are members of the 
cultural intelligentsia.  
(10) The policy of the nationalizing state. State authorities in the 
nationalizing states have a number of policy options vis-a-vis the national 
minorities in general and towards the Russian group in particular, ranging from 
attempts at deliberate extinction of the minorities (genocide, expulsion, or forced 
assimilation), via minority protection, to apartheid (deliberate perpetuation of 
insurmountable differences among the ethnic groups). One would perhaps 
assume that the paramount concern of any state authority is to secure the political 
loyalty of all members of the community towards the state. In other words, they 
should be expected to focus their attention on the vertical axis of our matrix. The 
cultural selfunderstanding of the residents would have been of little importance, 
were it not for the fact that these two dimensions of identity are regularly seen as 
being intimately linked to each other. The loyalty of cultural minorities is not 
taken for granted in the same way as the loyalty of the dominant group is.  
The identity trajectory of a given minority group may of course develop quite 
differently from the direction  in which the state authorities want to push it. For 
instance a heavy-handed assimilation policy may produce a backlash of political 
disloyalty and restitutionist sentiment. 
 (11) The policy of the external homeland towards the diaspora. The policy 
options of the Russian Federation range from total disinterestedness via 
insistence on minority rights for the Russians in the 'near abroad' to military 
intervention for their protection. Total disinterestedness will make the diaspora 
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less inclined to choose the external homeland as the focus of their identity. 
Conversely, if Russia acts as if the diaspora Russians were still 'citizens of 
Russia', a large number of diaspora Russians will continue to see themselves 
under this caption (A2). 
(12) The attitudes of the Russians in the Russian Federation. Ethnic cohesion 
is of course a two-way street, demanding active involvement of both parties, the 
core group and the diaspora. If the Russians in the Russian Federation show a 
large degree of indifference to the plight of their ethnic brethren outside Russia, 
the diaspora is more likely to develop an identity of their own. On the other hand, 
frequent visits of Russian nationalist agitators in the region  may reinforce the 
feeling a shared destiny.  
The Moscow-based Congress of Russian Communities,  which serves as one 
of the main conduits between  the  Russian public and Russian diaspora 
organizations, propagates activist and restitutionist attitudes (Declaration 1994). 
The Russian public, however, seems to be divided over the issue. In a 1991 poll 
39.5 per cent  believed that Russia should act as guarantor of the rights of 
Russians in the near abroad, while 22.3 per cent  felt that those who live on the 
territory of other republics should solve their own problems (Rossiiskaia gazeta 
24 October 1991). 
(13) Migratory currents. A replenishment of the Russian diaspora 
communities by fresh immigrants coming from Russia will contribute to the 
sustenance of strong cultural and political links to Russia and to the Russian core 
group. If the migratory currents are reversed and large numbers of Russians 
begin to leave, this will stimulate integration among those who stay behind, for 
two reasons. The emigrants will usually be the ones who are least willing or able 
to adapt, and secondly, after their departure the remaining diaspora community 
will become smaller (Susokolov 1992).  
However, limited and large-scale out-migration will affect the structure of the 
diaspora communities differently. Well-educated elites will more easily find new 
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jobs elsewhere than will people with little formal education. Medium size pull-
factor migration therefore will tend to create diaspora groups with many Indians 
and few chieftains, less able to sustain a distinct identity.9 Large-scale push-
factor migration which takes on the character of mass flight, on the other hand, 
will leave behind a socially more diversified diaspora community.  
The flows of Russian outmigration to the non-Russian regions of the USSR 
peaked in the late 1950s and were reversed in the 1970s. Declining birthrates 
among Russians meant that they no longer had any population surplus to export. 
At the same time, the need for qualified Russian labour in the non-Russian 
republics was steadily diminishing as the titular nationalities in the non-Russians 
republics caught up in the modernization process. The Baltic states represented 
an exception to this pattern. Large-scale Russian migration to this region 
continued in spite of the high modernizational level of the Balts (Anderson and 
Silver 1989). 
After 1991 inmigration of Russian to the Soviet Successor states has 
continued to go down, partly as a result of migration quotas introduced by the 
new state authorities. At the same time outmigration has increased, reaching e.g. 
fiftyone thousands in Latvia in 1992 and fortyseven thousands in Kyrgyzstan in 
first six months of the same year, (all ethnic groups) (Bungs 1993; Slavianskie 
vesti [Bishkek] 1992 no. 16).  
 
III Probable identity developments, region-wise.  
TABLE 2 TO 4 IN HERE 
 
The Baltics. The Russian communities in the Baltic states are genereally 
characterized by high shares of the total population and low degrees of 
rootedness. While there were sizable Russian minorities in the interwar Baltic 
states, particularly in Latvia, most present-day Baltic Russians nevertheless are 
post-war immigrants. They comprise as much as thirty per cent and thirtyfour per 
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cent of the total population of Estonia and Latvia, respectively. Together with 
other Slavs and Russified former Soviet citizens they make up hefty thirtynine 
per cent and fortyeight per cent. In some districts in the eastern parts of the 
countries they account for ninety-ninetysix per cent (Estonia) and sixty per cent 
(Latvia) of the total population. Russia is just across the border. In combination, 
these factors favour the retention of a traditional Russian identity and continued 
strong links to the external homeland. To the degree that the various Russian-
speaking groups converge the outcome will be a common 'new identity'.  
Compared to other Russian diaspora groups in the former Soviet Union the 
Baltic-Russian communities have a pronounced proletarian profile. Industrial 
workers predominate and also most of the intelligentsia is engaged in material 
production. While workers certainly also may become political leaders, one 
would expect this social structure to complicate the articulation of common goals 
and the upkeep of traditional Russian values. Nevertheless, Baltic Russians have 
formed a larger number of organizations to cultivate and express their interests 
than have Russians in most other areas.  
Balts often claim that a cultural chasm separates them from the Russian 
immigrants to their republics while the Russians tend to emphasize the important 
common elements in Baltic and Russian cultures (Europeanness, Christian 
religion, high degrees of modernization, etc.) (Lieven 1993, pp. 185-7). The 
Baltics is probably the only region in the former Soviet Union where many local 
Russians are apt to see the indigenous civilization as equal or even superior to 
their own (Abyzov 1992; Gudkov 1993). Their intense appreciation of the high 
Baltic standard of living also gives them a strong incentive to emulate the 'Baltic 
way of life'. A 'Balticization' of Russian settlers in the area was in fact detected 
already in the 1970s (Kazlas 1977, p. 241). Many of them claim that they are 
more hard-working and punctual than Russians at home, and attribute these traits 
to the healthy influence of the Protestant work ethic of the titular nationalities. As 
a result of new, strict Baltic migration policies in-migration of new arrivals from 
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Russia has practically stopped. These factors should, in contrast to the ones 
discussed above, favour a development towards the bottom of the identity matrix.  
Political authorities in Estonia and Latvia have little trust in the loyalty of the 
local Russians. They have expressed fears that the bifurcation of their societies 
will be perpetuated indefinitely unless harsh pressure is applied upon the 
Russians to integrate. Estonia and Latvia are the only post-Soviet states which 
have not granted the resident Russian population of post-war immigrants status 
as original citizens (Kolstø 1993b). This has created strong reactions in the 
Russian communities as well as in Russia. Probably more than any other factor 
the Latvian and Estonian citizenship legislation has contributed to the hardening 
of attitudes on the diaspora question in Russia, among policy makers as well as in 
the public (Kolstoe 1995). Baltic legislative practices, touted as a means to 
secure accelerated integration of the Russians into society, may well have the 
opposite effect, and push parts of the Russians towards non-cooperation and non-
adaptation.  
In Lithuania, the situation is different. The Russians are fewer (less than ten 
per cent) and their proficiency in the titular language is higher than in any other 
former Soviet republic (thirtyseven per cent). The country does not have a 
common border with mainland Russia.10 Generally speaking, members of the 
dominant nationality do not perceive the Russians as a threat to their cultural 
survival or political independence. All post-war immigrants have been granted 
automatic citizenship. The pull towards socio-political integration and perhaps 
even towards acculturalization seems to be fairly strong.  
There is an abundance of material on the identity formation of Baltic 
Russians, both statements of Baltic Russian diaspora leaders and opinion 
surveys. Most indicate a tendency both towards the establishment of distinct 
Baltic-Russian cultures and a certain resilience of traditional Soviet attitudes.  
Natalia Kasatkina, cochairwoman of the Russian Cultural Centre in 
Lithuania, describes the Russians in her country as a 'subethnos with its own 
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destiny' (Kasatkina 1994, p. 112). The leader of the Latvian Society for Russian 
Culture, Iurii Abyzov, on the other hand, strongly emphasizes the pro-imperial, 
pro-Soviet sentiments among Russians in his country. Having overheard 
bragging statements like 'I came here as a boy, riding on the top of a tank', he 
concludes gloomily: 'In general we should remember that an empire always 
draws to its outlying areas far from its best human material.' (Abyzov 1992) 
Statements like this one are rare among Russian diaspora spokesmen and it seems 
to reflect the bifurcation between an old, prewar community of Latvian Russians, 
whom Abyzov represents, and the large groups of postwar immigrants.  
In a pioneering study in 1992 Aadne Aasland was struck by the strong 
diversity of Latvian Russian identities. While many Russians were well 
integrated into Latvian society, 'imperial identity is quite widespread among 
certain sub-groups of the Russian population' (Aasland 1994a; Aasland 1994b, p. 
81). In a survey of Russian opinions in Estonia in 1993 the pollsters also here 
found attitudes which they interpreted as 'empire-mindedness': thirtyseven per 
cent of the Russian respondents said they felt bereft of a homeland after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (Kirch and Kirch 1995, p. 48). The Estonian 
researchers nevertheless detected a slow but perceptible identity change among 
Estonian Russians towards an embryonic Estonian-Russian local identity. They 
saw the typical Estonian-Russian self-perception as ambiguous: Russians in 
Estonia feel some resonance with Russians in Russia, but at the same time they 
recognize in the Russian core group certain characteristic traits from which they 
wish to dissociate themselves (A. Kirch 1994, p. 41; Vetik 1994; Vetik 1995). 
In a major study in 1993 encompassing all three Baltic countries, Richard 
Rose and William Maley found that fifty per cent of all Russian respondents 
most often identified with their city/locality while only twentynine per cent listed 
'Russian' as their first identity choice. In contrast, only twentytwo per cent of the 
Balts put city/locality above nationality in their hierarchy of identities. Sixtynine 
per cent of all Baltic Russians felt that they had a 'great deal' or 'some' in 
 22 
common with the titular nationality. The corresponding figures for Lithuanians, 
Latvians and Estonians were only twentyfour to twentynine (Rose and Maley 
1994, pp. 51-5). 
Belarus. Russians in Belarus number more than one million (thirteen per cent 
of the total). In addition, 1.5 million Belorussians in Belarus are linguistically 
Russified. Belorussian national identity is very young and brittle, a product of the 
twentieth century. The prestige of the Belarusian language is surprisingly low 
even among Belarusians.  In a 1992 survey in Eastern Belarus more than sixty 
per cent claimed that they  more or less regularly heard disrespectful remarks 
about the Belarusian language uttered by ethnic Belarusians (Zlotnikov 1993, p. 
39). 
The educational level among Russians in the republic is well above the 
average Belarusian level (Clem 1990). Belorussians are strongly attracted to the 
larger and more consolidated Russian culture. Evidence of this is the May 1995 
referendum which showed strong support for the introduction of Russian as a 
second state language, and for greater integration with Russia.  
Neither the Russian language nor Russian ethnic identity is under threat in 
Belarus. Russia is adjacent, and to be a Russian in Belarus is almost like being a 
Russian 'at home', in Russia proper (Grigor'eva and Martynova 1994). This will 
reinforce the retention of strong identity links to Russia both politically and 
culturally, mostly in the shape of 'traditional Soviet'. Indeed, the major Russian 
language daily in Minsk is still called 'Soviet Belarussia', and functions as a 
strong conveyor of restitutionist sentiment.  
Ukraine. The Russian population in Ukraine makes up as much as eleven 
millions and is the largest Russian diaspora group by far. The Russian 
settlements are often centuries-old, and geographical distance to Russia is short, 
particularly in the Eastern part of the country, where a majority of the Russians 
are living. A separate Russian identity is therefore anchored in both high 
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numbers, a high degree of rootedness, and geographical proximity to the external 
homeland.  
At the same time, the cultural distance to the Ukrainian environment is very 
short. Until recently the affinity between the Russian and the Ukrainian cultures 
worked in favour of the former: many Ukrainians in the Ukraine (not to mention 
in the Soviet Ukrainian diaspora) adopted Russian as their mother tongue. Today, 
under new political realities, this tendency is likely to be reversed: many 
Russified Ukrainians will rediscover their cultural roots. In addition, in 
independent Ukraine a large number of Russians will no doubt learn the state 
language. This will not demand much of an effort, and will increase their chances 
for social advancement. Assimilation might take place among some Russians 
who live scattered in heavily Ukrainian-populated areas as has also occurred in 
the past (Chizhikova 1968, pp. 22-5).11  
To many Russians in Russia proper the idea of an independent Ukrainian 
state is completely outlandish (Brzezinski 1994). To them Ukraine is an old 
Russian province inhabited by people who are 'practically' Russians. The Russian 
population in Ukraine, however, has indicated that it thinks differently. In 
December 1991, a very large percentage of them voted for Ukrainian 
independence (Vydrin 1992). Apparently, many supported this idea in the 
expectation of a swift Ukrainian Wirtschaftswunder which has so far not 
materialized. The economic hardships in the country might take on ethnic 
overtones, driving segments of the Russian group towards the Dniester syndrome 
or irredentism. In Crimea, where both legal, historical, and demographic 
arguments for unification with Russia can be marshalled, irredentist sentiments 
are running high.  
A 1992 survey of three Ukrainian cities, Lviv, Kiev and Simferopol, showed 
that eightynine and eightyeight per cent  of the Russian inhabitants in Lviv and 
Kiev wanted to be a citizen of the Ukrainian state (in Simferopol in the Crimea  
support for Ukrainian statehood was radically lower; only twentyseven per cent). 
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At the same time, more than forty per cent of the Russians interviewed also 
would prefer it if the Soviet Union still existed (Bremmer  1994b). This adds up 
to almost 130 per cent support for incompatible alternatives, indicating rather 
unsettled or muddled political loyalties. 
Along the cultural axis, Russians in Ukraine tend to feel both attached to and 
removed from the Russian core group.12 As pointed out by Andrei Malgin at the 
Simferopol Regional museum, this ambivalence is shared also by other Russian 
groups in the periphery of the Russian ethnographical space, such as the 
Sibirians, and may be interpreted as a case of  general Russian regionalism.13 
N.M. Lebedeva asks but does not answer the question: 'is Russians in Ukraine a 
diaspora or a part of the Russian people?' (Lebedeva 1994). The answer is 
clearly:  'both', since few Russians in Ukraine see any contradiction between 
those two identities. 
Moldova. The distance between Russian and Moldovan cultures is shorter 
than the Russian-Baltic distance, but longer than Russian-Ukrainian and Russian-
Belorussian ones. Moldovans and Russians share the same religion, Orthodoxy, 
but speak very different languages. All permanent residents of Moldova have 
been granted original citizenship, but many Russians nevertheless feel that they 
are not accepted as part of the body politic on a par with ethnic Moldovans 
(Lukyanchikova 1994).  
In the first years after independence Moldova used the language of ethnic 
rather than civic nation-building to a larger degree than most other Soviet 
successor states in official state documents (Kolstø, 1993b; Kolstoe 1995). Also 
the prospect of Romanian-Moldovan state unification made the half a million 
Russians uneasy. At the present time unification is clearly not in vogue among 
ethnic Moldovans but it remains an issue by virtue of the demographic and 
linguistic realities.  
Geographically, Russians in Moldova are further removed from Russia than 
are any other Russian diaspora group in the European part of the former Soviet 
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Union. This factor adds to their feeling of vulnerability. These circumstances are 
likely to produce an identity development towards the centre or lower left corner 
of our matrix. Indicatively, 'the Dniester syndrome' derives its name from 
developments in Moldova. After the Dniester war in 1992, however,  official 
rhetoric in Chisinau was changed from ethnic towards civic nation-building. If 
this new departure is followed through it might stimulate the formation of 
integrated minority mentalities. 
In interviews with the author in 1992   in  Chisinau and Tiraspol leading 
Russian spokesmen of different political convictions all agreed that Russians in 
Moldova had developed an identity of their own.14  State Secretary of the 
Dniester Moldovan Republic, Valerii Litskai, defined the local Russian culture as 
a 'homestead culture' (using the English expression), and likened it to the frontier 
mentality of the American Mid-West.  
An opinion poll conducted in 1992 showed that approximately half of all 
Moldovan Russians (fiftythree per cent) regarded themselves as different from 
Russians in Russia (Stepanova 1992). At the same time, in another survey 
conducted in the same year one quarter of the Russian respondents gave answers 
which were interpreted by the pollsters as 'a nostalgia for the Soviet Union' 
(Danii and Gontsa 1992). 
Moldova is one of the few Soviet successor states where Russians do not 
constitute the largest minority, this being the Ukrainians. Due to Moldova's 
proximity to Ukraine and the policy of the Moldovan government, which favours 
reopening of Ukrainians schools and cultural facilities, the chances that Russians 
and other Slavs in Moldova will coalesce into a common Russian-speaking group 
are relatively small.  
Transcaucasia. The three Transcaucasian republics have experienced very 
little demographic penetration of Russians, in 1989, Russian shares of the total 
population varied between one and six per cent. Due to their small numbers many 
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Russians in Transcaucasia have learnt the local language (fluency percentages of 
twentythree in Georgia and thirtythree in Armenia in 1989).  
Protracted ethnic warfare in the region has induced scores of Russians to 
leave. Hence, the already very small Russian communities are further 
diminished. There is every reason to believe that those who stay behind are those 
best integrated into society. The  evidence also indicates that Russian old-timers 
in Transcaucasia have a feeling of being rather dissimilar to Ciscaucasian 
Russians. In 1994 a prominent Russian Georgian writer described himself as  
a third generation inhabitant of Tbilisi with a mediocre command 
of Georgian. At the same time, I speak Russian with a distinct 
Georgian pronunciation. I am raised in the traditions of Russian 
culture and have no intention of betraying them, but at the same 
time my customs and habits are Georgian. (...) In a certain sense, I 
am a typical Georgian Russian (Osinskii 1994).  
While this self-description fits the integrating new diaspora type, others see 
the 'typical Georgian Russian' as more or less assimilated: one source describes 
him and her as 'not quite a Russian, or not even a Russian at all' (Mikeladze 
1993). A  further development towards integration  and even some assimilation 
may be expected.  
Central Asia. Central Asia is the post-Soviet region furthest removed from 
Russia, geographically as well as culturally. To an extreme degree the Russians 
and other Europeans have been clustered in the cities, particularly in the capitals. 
Marriages between the Russians and indigenous groups are statistically 
negligible, of 134 Russians interviewed in Tashkent in 1992, Jürgen Nowak 
found only one person with an Uzbek parent (0.7 per cent) (Nowak 1994, p. 46). 
On the other hand, marriages among the various European diaspora groups are 
very frequent. Central Asian Russians usually make no distinctions among 
themselves and other Europeans in the area, but indiscriminately lump everyone 
together as 'Russians'.15  
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Only a tiny fraction of the Europeans (between one and five per cent) are 
fluent in the native languages. Two distinct cultural communities, Asian and 
European, have been living side by side. In the opinion of one well-informed 
observer, pro-Soviet nostalgia is more widespread among Russophones  in 
Central Asia than among inhabitants of the Russian Federation (Rotar 1993). 
However, they  seem to  wail the disappearance of the unitary state more than the 
political ideology it was shrouded in.  
Russians in Central Asia are mostly engaged in production and construction, 
as engineers, managers, and workers. On the average, their educational level is 
well above that of the indigenous groups (Ostapenko and Susokolov 1992). They 
have been granted automatic citizenship in their state of residence (in 
Turkmenistan, even the right to obtain dual Turkmenistani-Russian citizenship). 
Nevertheless, most of them feel politically marginalized. Social and political 
advancement in these societies largely rest with the old tribe- and clan-structures 
from which the Europeans are excluded. Also in industrial management and 
research, previously bastions of the Europeans, the top jobs are gradually being 
taken over by the locals. For social support and social values the Russians have 
relied heavily on the Soviet state structures which have now vanished.  
The already strong feeling of vulnerability among Central Asian Russians has 
been further enhanced by the occasional flare-ups of ethnic conflicts which have 
visited several countries in the region. In Tajikistan a full-scale civil war among 
various Tajik clans erupted in 1992-93. These conflicts have rarely if ever 
involved the Russians directly, but they fear that the violence at any time might 
spread and encompass them as well. For these reasons the streams of Russians 
leaving the region have been wide. These have to a very little degree been offset 
by the arrival of new groups. The question of how many will remain when the 
outmigration tapers off has been a matter of much controversy (Perevedentsev 
1993; Dunlop 1994). If the most alarmist prognoses come true, only a fraction 
will be left by the year 2010. Those who do will most likely be the ones who are 
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best integrated into the new states. Should many Russians be persuaded to stay, a 
wider variety of more Russia-oriented identity types may be retained.  
Most Russians in Central Asia clearly feel different from mainland Russians 
(Brusina 1992, p. 84). They see themselves as less given to drinking, more 
hardworking, and more disciplined.16 The cultural selfunderstanding of most of 
them is leaning towards (B) 'new Russian'. This factor to some extent keeps back 
migration, and has also prompted a certain amount of remigration. Central Asian 
Russians complain that in Russia they are not receiving any cordial homecoming 
as ethnic brethren. As expressed by the leader of the 'Slavic Diaspora' 
organization  of southern Kyrgyzstan, V. Uleev:  
Many have already returned, at a considerable economic loss. It is 
indeed very difficult to adapt to new circimstances when you have 
a radically different mentality. More often than not those who 
think that they have arrived in their historical homeland, find that 
they are regarded as aliens (Uleev 1993). 
Kazakhstan. The vast Kazakhstani state (the size of Western Europe) 
stretches deep into Siberia and the southern Ural mountains. The entire northern 
tier of the country is predominantly inhabited by Russians and Russified 
Europeans who are usually engaged in either mining, engineering or agriculture. 
Their towns are hardly distinguishable from similar settlements across the border 
in Russia, neither is the cultural selfunderstanding of the local Russians. Russians 
in Kazakhstan are less versed in the titular language of their state of residence 
than their conationals in any other Soviet successor state (0.85 per cent fluency in 
1989). 
From the 1930s through the 1970s Russians made up the largest ethnic group 
in Kazakhstan. Today, some six million Russians live in Kazakhstan, making up 
almost thirtyeight per cent of the total population, the largest percentage of any 
Soviet successor state outside Russia. By dint of their numbers, rootedness, and 
generally high educational levels the Russians in Kazakhstan should be 
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guaranteed a future in Kazakhstani society for a long time to come. They are less 
given to flight than are Europeans further south, and Kazakhstani state authorities 
are expressly striving towards civic rather than ethnic nation-building. However, 
civic nation-building in a society with so disparate population elements as in 
Kazakhstan is extremely hard going, even with the best of will, and some 
observers have doubts about the earnestness of the Kazakhstani endeavours 
(Bremmer 1994a; Rotar 1994). As in the other Asian republics political authority 
largely flows through clan channels, and ethnic Kazakhs are increasingly filling 
the top notches in government and administration (Giller and Shatskikh 1993). A 
state program to promote the knowledge of Kazakh is fiercely resisted by 
Russians in the north, and tension between the two major ethnic groups seems to 
be mounting. Irredentism remains an identity option in the northern provinces.  
In southern Kazakhstan the Russians are fewer in number and more cut off 
from mainland Russia. This leads us to assume that Russian identity formation in 
northern and southern Kazakhstan will follow very different trajectories. In the 
north it will remain basically geared towards Russia, politically as well as 
culturally, while the south will see some outmigration and a growing willingness 
to adopt and integrate (but not assimilate) among those who choose to stay.17 
 
Concluding remarks.  
On the political loyalty axis there has been considerable movement in the 
Russian diaspora community over the last couple of years. Around 1990-91 a 
significant part of the Russians in several Soviet republics - ranging from perhaps 
a third to a half - in plebiscites and elections signalled a willingness to transfer 
their political allegiance to their state of residence. However, when the euphoria 
of de-imperialization faded away and the harsh realities of economic depression 
set in the pendulum changed its direction once more. Although few hard facts are 
available, the evidence indicates a certain strengthening of nostalgia for the 
 30 
Soviet past in many regions and also for identification with the contemporary 
Russian Federation. 
This newest trend, no more than the previous support for independence, 
should be automatically extrapolated into the future. It goes without saying that 
the political identity of the Russian diaspora in the next century will be 
completely dependent upon the political realities prevailing then. Should the CIS 
collapse and the new states develop quite independently of each other, this will 
confront the Russians with quite another situation than if CIS should prove a 
durable and viable political structure. Also, if relations among the Soviet 
successor states should evolve into some kind of neo-imperial arrangement, this 
will increase the likelihood of the 'traditional Soviet' and 'new Cossacks' options 
among Russians outside Russia. And last but not least: internal developments in 
Russia - towards prosperity or economic collapse, and towards democracy, 
anarchy or dictatorship - will determine the gravitational strength which this state 
can exert upon the Russian diaspora.  
Cultural selfunderstandings change much more slowly than do political 
convictions. However, a tendency of Russian periphery  communities to be 
influenced by their immediate ethnographical environment is much older than the 
debacle of the Soviet Union. More than hundred years ago, n 1878, the leading 
Muslim intellectual in the Russian Empire, Ismail bey Gasprinskii, remarked that  
the assimilationist ability of the Russians is obviously very weak. We 
see very few cases of Russified non-Russians,18 but quite a few 
examples of Russians who to some degree have submitted to the 
influence of the surrounding non-Russians. They adopt their language -
- without, of course abandoning their own -- as well as some customs, 
popular beliefs and dresses (Gasprinskii 1993, p. 38).  
110 years later, in 1988, (that is, before the break-up of the Soviet Union), a 
Russian intellectual in Estonia asserted that  
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Russians today is a peculiar national entity, an unprecedented historical 
experiment. On the one hand, a huge part of the people is living in a 
practically monoethnical territory. On the other hand, millions are 
dispersed on the territories of other republics. (...)  
For all practical purposes Russians in each republic constitute a 
particular ethnos with its own specific needs, cultural ballast and 
literature, frequently also with its own dialectical fragments (Portnikov 
1988). 
This assessment was seconded by a well-informed Russian antropologist, 
A.Susokolov, in 1992. As a scholar, Susokolov was inclined to use somewhat 
more cautious expressions:  
Even if the regional "republican" groups of Russians so far have not 
coalesced into independent sub-ethnoses, intense interethnic 
interaction, combined with a reduction of in-migration from the 
outside, can in the course of two to three generations lead to such an 
outcome (Susokolov 1992, p. 215).  
*** 
There is every reason to believe that the tendency towards a split in the 
Russian ethnos, between a diaspora and a core group, will the strengthened under 
the new political realities after the collapse of the unitary state (Laitin 1994). Of 
the eight identity options discussed in this articles the four on the axis of 'new 
cultural self-understanding' are in the opinion of this author likely to be 
strengthened most. In many areas this development will be boosted by the 
convergence of Russians and other Russophone diasporas into one group. The 
creation of new Russian diasporas as  separate cultural entities is not a matter of 
dissociation from the Russian core group only but also of association with other 
groups. However, in some places, such as in Moldova, this tendency will 
probably be off-set by ethnic revivals among the Russified non-Russian 
diasporas.  
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There is no reason to believe that the final outcome of the identity formation 
of the Russian communities in the Soviet successor states will be the creation of 
one, single diaspora identity. Not only the cohesion within the Russian ethnos at 
large - between the core and the periphery - is being weakened. This is true also 
of the cohesion within the diaspora itself. The social, political, economic, and 
cultural conditions under which the diaspora is living differ greatly. Rather than 
one diaspora identity we should expect the formation of several new identity 
types.  
 
 33 
                                                
 
 Acknowledgements. I would like to thank Rogers Brubaker, UCLA, and 
David Laitin, University of Chicago, for valuable comments and suggestions to 
this article.  
 
NOTES 
 
1 The authors used the English word 'dispersion', rather than the Greek 'diaspora', but in the same sense 
as diaspora is used in this paper.  
2  The nouns  ‘option’ and  'choice’  may be  somewhat misleading, insofar as they   imply a voluntary 
and conscious process which cannot be assumed. They will, however, be employed  throughout the 
chapter. Whenever this is done, they should be understood in  a metaphorical sense as synonymous 
with 'adoption'. 
3 The matrix is revised  from an earlier version used in my earlier article (Kolstø  1993a). The terms  
'nationalizing state' and  'external homeland'  are taken from Rogers Brubaker (1993b).  
4  For convenience's sake we may regard  the Soviet Union and the Russian tsarist empire  as  
coextensive.  
5   Some  Cossacks will claim that they are a 'sub-ethnos' under the Russian nation, while others   
maintain  that they constitute a separate nation. Finally,  some Cossacks define themselves not in ethnic, 
but in social terms, describing themselves as a soslovie, or estate.  Author's conversations with 
Cossacks in Tiraspol and Kuban, September 1992. 
6  This is true also of residents of remote areas of the Russian Federation  such as the Sibiriaks. 
7 Author's interviews with Valerii Litskai, State Secretary of DMR, Tiraspol,  and with Crimean 
nationalist politicians Iurii Meshkov, Anatolii Los' and Vladimir Terekhov in Simferopol, September 
1992. 
8 Not everyone will agree to  this. John Armstrong  (1976) thinks that proletarian  diasporas lacking 
elites, in contrast to mobilized diaspora possessing elites,   will  tend to become progressively more 
distinct culturally and in physical appearance from the dominant ethnic group.   
9 Author's conversation with Vladimir Steshenko, Nationalities director in the Latvian 
government until 1993, since then  a Russian diaspora activist and journalist, in Riga, May 
1992.  
10 Lithuania does border on the Kaliningrad enclave, but this fact does not seem to be of great import to 
Lituanian Russians. 
11 Already in 1989  the only sizable group of  Russian diasporians who had abandoned Russian as their 
mother tongue consisted of  linguistically Ukrainified Russians  in Ukraine (some 180 thousands). 
12 Author's interviews in Simferopol, September 1992 and Donetsk, September 1994,  
with, inter alia, the leader of the Republican Movement of Crimea, Iurii Meshkov, and the 
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indication of this is that even Russian-speaking Koreans, who were deported  to the region in the 1930s, 
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16 Author's interviews in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,  and Uzbekistan, May 1993.  
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